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Abstract
A simple quantitative example of a reflexive feedback process and the resulting
price dynamics after an exogenous price shock to a financial network is presented.
Furthermore, an outline of a theory that connects financial reflexivity, which stems
from cross-ownership and delayed or incomplete information, and no-arbitrage pric-
ing theory under systemic risk is provided.
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1 Introduction
Despite of George Soros’s fame as one of the most successful speculators of the 20th
century, his theory of reflexivity in finance – first published in Soros (1987) – has not
gained a lot of academic attention. A few notable exceptions are the works of Cross and
Strachan (1997), Bryant (2002), Kwong (2008) and Palatella (2010). While the latter two
papers are concerned with mathematical models of reflexivity (both in terms of discrete
time dynamical systems) and while the article by Palatella indeed is on pricing models, it
can certainly be said that aspects of reflexivity in quantitative finance have hardly been
considered in the past. For instance, there seem to be no quantitative models of reflexivity
in finance which take into account systemic risk (stemming from the cross-ownership of
financial assets) as a major influence of valuation or price dynamics. This short note
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therefore has the intention to first explore an extremely simple example of reflexivity and
systemic risk in finance as the main cause of price dynamics in the case of an exogenous
price shock to an underlying asset. The next section will outline the mentioned numeric
example while recapitulating some of the basic ideas of reflexivity in finance according
to Soros (1987, 2010). The third section then relates the example to the no-arbitrage
pricing theory under systemic risk which has been developed in recent years (see Fischer
(2012) and the references therein). It gives an outlook at a much more general model and
a (for a lack of better terms) unifying theory which could have the potential to merge the
existing theory of risk-neutral valuation under systemic risk and a quantitative theory of
reflexivity in finance. This connection might astonish readers who know Soros’s work,
as he seems to view reflexivity and no-arbitrage theory (as an equilibrium theory) as
somewhat irreconcilable (cf. Soros (2010)).
This short note might at a later stage be replaced with an article of the same or a
similar title which would elaborate in more detail on the ideas presented in here.
2 The example
Consider two financial entities called firm 1 and firm 2, these could be banks, hedge
funds or similar, who regularly publish their quarterly results. We add systemic risk, or
counterparty risk, into this small system by assuming that firm 1 owns 50% of the equity
of firm 2, and vice versa. Firm 1 holds commodities besides its share of firm 2. Firm 2
holds cash besides its share of firm 1. Both firms are levered through debt. Furthermore,
we assume that the two firms are in a state of incomplete or delayed information in the
sense that they base their quarterly published balance statements on the latest available
published financial data which is one quarter back in the case of the respective other
company’s equity. Furthermore, and aside from up-to-date commodities prices in the
case of firm 1, this (price) information is the only information the firms use in calculating
their balance sheets.
How does reflexivity enter the picture? We have as cognitive functions (cf. Soros (1987,
2010)) that each firm observes the other firm, i.e. each firm observes the publication of
financial statements of the respective other firm. We have as manipulative functions
(cf. Soros (1987, 2010)) that each firm states their own results based on (incomplete or
delayed) information about the other firm obtained through the cognitive function. Note
that in this simple example the cognitive and the manipulative function are imperfect in
the sense that they rely on delayed information about the other firm’s financial status.
How does the reflexive feedback process (or loop) work (cf. Soros (2010))? Assume
that, at time 0, the two firms are in an equilibrium in the following sense: both firms have
$500 in debt, firm 1 owns $1,000 worth of commodities, firm 2 owns $1,000 cash. Let us
assume that each company’s equity is $1,000. Then, as firm 1 and 2 each hold 50% of the
respective other firms equity (momentarily worth $500), we obtain the following balance
2
sheets (Assets = Liabilities + Equity) at time 0:
Firm 1:
$1, 000 commodities + $500 share in Firm 2 = $500 debt + $1, 000 equity,
Firm 2:
$1, 000 cash + $500 share in Firm 1 = $500 debt + $1, 000 equity.
Now, we assume an external shock: at time 1 (one quarter after time 0), the value
of the commodities firm 1 holds has dropped from $1,000 to $700. The firms use their
incomplete, delayed knowledge (cognitive function) to set up their new balance statements
(manipulative function) at time 1:
Firm 1:
$700 commodities + $500 share in Firm 2 = $500 debt + $700 equity,
Firm 2:
$1, 000 cash + $500 share in Firm 1 = $500 debt + $1, 000 equity.
This new situation can be seen as a disequilibrium, as the balance sheet of firm 2 contains
outdated information about firm 1 (it contains a 50% share of firm 1’s equity of $1,000
from time 0, which is now only worth $700, but firm 2 can not know this yet1), and vice
versa. A reflexive feedback process has been set in motion (see also Soros (2010)), as next
quarter (at time 2) firm 2 will recognize the changed situation and adapt. In turn, this
will lower firm 2’s equity, which will picked up by firm 1 another quarter later, and so on.
A vicious circle, or downward spiral, has been started (cf. Fischer (2012)), but, as we will
see below, a new equilibrium will be reached in the end. This situation would therefore
have to be characterized as a negative feedback loop in the sense of Soros (2010), which in
the limit leads to a stable setup, rather than a positive feedback loop, which would lead
to boom-bust-like dynamics for asset prices (cf. Soros, 2010).
For the sake of this example, assume now that commodities correct one more time,
to stabilize at $500 at time 2. The new equilibrium, that would be reached after this
(negative) reflexive feedback process has run its course, is:
Firm 1:
$500 commodities + $333.33 share in Firm 2 = $500 debt + $333.33 equity,
Firm 2:
$1, 000 cash + $166.67 share in Firm 1 = $500 debt + $666.67 equity.
This new equilibrium is indeed only the limiting case of the reflexive feedback loop (com-
pare Soros (2010)) and, mathematically, the equilibrium is never reached2.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide a more detailed outline of the actual price dynamics over
time, as well as a chart, where the convergence to the limiting equilibrium can be seen.
1For instance, firm 2 might not know this, because the balance sheet of firm 1 does not state what
commodities exactly it holds, so firm 2 can obtain the value of the equity of firm 1 only as stated on that
firm’s balance sheet.
2For all practical purposes, however, it is reached after some time. See also Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
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3 Towards a more general theory
It is clear that the extremely simple example of reflexivity in the previous section only
captures one small aspect of reflexivity in finance (in this case with respect to delayed or
incomplete price information) as understood by Soros (1987, 2010). However, the theory
behind the presented example could be an important link between reflexivity and the
existing standard no-arbitrage pricing theory of mathematical finance which, so far, could
be termed as non-reflexive.
What seems to be at hand with the outlined example is a dynamic, reflexive sys-
temic risk model under partial (or delayed) information. However, if one compares the
recursive procedure that was used in Section 2 to the methods used in Fischer (2012), it
becomes immediately clear that this procedure corresponds to the repeated iteration of
the function Φ in Fischer (2012), that was used in a Picard Iteration to determine the (in
this case: unique) no-arbitrage prices of assets and liabilities in a system with systemic
risk. Only, in Fischer (2012), this recursive procedure was understood as a method to
instantaneously price assets under full information (an instantaneous equilibrium), while,
in the reflexive example of Section 2, the procedure needs to be re-interpreted in a quite
different manner, namely as the convergence over time (by means of a reflexive feedback
process) to an equilibrium under incomplete information. Expressed differently, the re-
cursion now describes the price dynamics over time during a market adjustment after
an external price shock. From Fischer (2012) and the references therein, it is clear that
similar examples (that converge to a new equilibrium after an external price shock in an
underlying exogenous asset) can be constructed for arbitrarily many firms and much more
complicated ownership structures and liabilities. For instance, derivatives and different
seniorities of debt can be incorporated into this model.
In this sense, the example of Section 2 appears to show a way to the development
of more quantitative research about and more applications of reflexivity in finance in
a manner that is consistent with existing no-arbitrage pricing theory. Note that while
the mentioned iteration of a function Φ and convergence to a limiting equilibrium in a
time-discrete setup seems to imply a certain similarity of our ideas with those of Kwong
(2008) and Palatella (2010), there are several important differences that fundamentally
distinguish our ideas from these two (distinct) approaches to reflexivity in finance. To
mention one such difference, our approach is focussed on systemic risk stemming from
the cross-ownership of liabilities in a network of financial firms, which is a feature that
Kwong (2008) and Palatella (2010) do not consider. Mathematical details would have to
be outlined in an extended version of this paper.
As a final, more philosophical remark regarding the ideas presented above, note that
reflexivity as outlined here essentially means that the market (or a network of financial
firms) constantly watches itself and then reacts to its observations. However, because of
an information delay, this procedure is subject to incomplete (or flawed) information at
any time it is in progress.
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Figure 1: Example: detailed price information over time.
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Figure 2: Chart of example price dynamics over time.
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Figure 3: Example overview.
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